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RECENT DECISIONS.
ALIMONY - DIVORCE -JURISDICTION. Under a Separation
Agreement executed by two residents of New York, the husband
promised to pay his wife Five Dollars a week during her coverture.
The wife instituted divorce proceedings in Nevada. The husband
remained a resident of New York, did not appear in the Nevada
action, nor was any personal service had upon him. After obtain-
ing an absolute divorce by the husband's default, the wife returned
to New York and sues for alimony due under the agreement. HnLD,
that she was bound by the Nevada divorce, although her husband
might have attacked it. Hence, he is not liable. (Felberbaum v.
Felberbaum, N. Y. Law Journal, Jan. 12, 1915.)
The decision serves to illustrate the attitude of New York
toward foreign divorces. It is the settled law of this State that a
decree of divorce granted in any State against a resident of New
York is void for want of jurisdiction, unless (1) the defendant was
served with process within the jurisdiction of that court or (2)
has appeared in person or by answer and thus submitted himself to
that jurisdiction. (People v. Baker, 76 N. Y.,, 78; Matter of Kin-
ball, 155 N. Y., 62.) Of course, to take cognizance of any pro-
ceeding, it is essential that the court have jurisdiction, i. e., an au-
thority validly to adjudge the rights and obligations of the parties
to the controversy. In divorce, separation or annulment proceed-
ings, the law of the actual bona fide domicile of the parties, gives
jurisdiction to ,ater the marital status. 2 Bishop, Marr., Div., &
Separ., § 48.
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Under statutory provisions, each State prescribes a certain
period of residence as necessary before a party may seek relief be-
fore its courts in divorce proceedings. (See N. Y. Code §§ 1756,
1763.) Mere residence, i. e., a temporary abiding, is not sufficient
It must amount to a domicile: a bona fide residence accompanied
with an intent to remain indefinitely. (Campbell v. Campbell, 90
Hun, 233.) A party then, who has complied with the statutory re-
quirement may apply to the court of the domicile to have his or her
marital status altered or dissolved.
The question then arises, how far is the decree rendered bind-
ing. It is settled in New York that such a decree "is valid so far
as it affects the marital status of the plaintiff, if *granted by a court,
pursuant to its statutes, to one of its resident citizens in an action
brought by such resident against a citizen of another State, though
defendant never appears nor is served within that jurisdiction.
Yet the marital status of such non-resident defendant is in no way
changed thereby." (Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N. Y., 408; Starbuck
v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y., 503.) In other words, a divorce granted
by another State against a New York resident who has not sub-
mitted to the foreign jurisdiction, is of no effect in New York, even
though all statutory requirements of that State as to residence,
substituted service, etc., have been observed. (People v. Baker,
supra; O'Dea v. O'Dea, 101 N. Y., 23; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y.,
217; Jones v. Jones, 108 N. Y., 415.) "The process of courts run
only within the jurisdiction which issues them. -They cannot be
served without the jurisdiction which issues them and the courts
of one State cannot acquire jurisdiction over citizens of another
State, under statutes which authorize a substituted service or which
provide for actual service without the jurisdiction, so as to author-
ize a judgment in personam against the party defendant." (Jones
v. Jones, supra.) "A State may adjudge- the status of its citizens
toward a non-resident; and may authorize to that end such judicial
proceedings as it sees fit. Other States must acquiesce, so long as
the operation of the judgment is kept within, its own confines. But
that judgment cannot push its effects over the borders of another
State to the subversion of its laws and the defeat of its policy, and
fix upon a citizen thereof a status, against his will and without his
consent and in hostility to the laws of the sovereignity of his alle-
giance." (People v. Baker, supra.)
Is this a violation of the provision in the United States Con-
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stitution requiring that "full faith and credit shall be given in each
State to the judicial proceedings of every other State?" New York
seems to answer that such a decree is of no binding force but a
"mere arbitrary prescription" and as such entitled to no recogni-
tion. Nor is there any principle of comity which "demands that
another sovereignty shall permit the status of its citizens to be af-
fected" by a foreign divorce "when contrary to its own public policy
or its standard of morals." These words hint at the reason for
New York's attitude. The "standard of morals" of New York is
shown by the fact that but one ground is sufficient to warrant a
divorce, viz., adultery. New York stands perhaps alone in thus
strictly limiting the grounds for divorce, and, when we realize that
in many States there are no less than sixteen-scarcely any State
runs below five grounds, we may conclude that a foreign divorce
is very likely to tend to the subversion of our laws and the defeat
of our policy,--although if it were granted for adultery it seems it
would not run counter to our "standard of morals."
While the decision in the principal case may fairly be based
on the ground of estoppel, yet it is submitted that the language used
is inexact. We have the defendant "ratifying" a decree absolutely
void as to him. True, there is an estoppel by record against the
plaintiff. Having invoked the jurisdiction of Nevada, she cannot
be heard to question it-not because of the fact that her husband
"ratified" the decree, but because of the estoppel.
The New York attitude toward foreign divorces has been se-
verely criticised because of the uncertainties and hardships result-
ing therefrom. Yet, we believe, with Folger, J., that "it is better,
by an adherence to the policy and law of our jurisdiction, to make
the clash the more and the earlier known and felt, so that the sooner
may there be an authoritative determination of the' conflict," by
Federal supervision.
CORPORATIOnS-LIABILITY OF DIRECTOR FOR NEGLECT. The
complaint alleged that defendant, a director of plaintiff corporation,
neglected to inform it of a continued misapplication of the funds
of plaintiff's subsidiary corporation by its general manager. HELD,
that a cause of action was stated, the damages being the diminution
in value of plaintiff's stock. (General Rubber Company v. Bene-
dict, 164 A. D., 332.)
Directors must use ordinary care and prudence in the manage-
ment of the corporation-the same degree of care and prudence that
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men prompted by self-interest generally exercise in their own af-
fairs. (Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y., 65.) What constitutes a breach of
this duty depends of course upon the particular facts involved. But
applying the test of the New York courts to the principal case, it
cannot be doubted that the decision is sound. If the defendant, in-
stead of being a director in the holding corporation, had individual-
ly held the shares of the subsidiary company, it seems self-evident
that he would have takeh steps to stop any misapplication of the
latter's funds. Whether or not the action is properly brought by
the plaintiff corporation, which is a stockholder in the defrauded
corporation, presents a different and more difficult question. The
law regards an injury done to a corporation by a director as done
to the corporation itself and not to the stockholders. Hence the
action is one which must be brought in the corporate name. (Cook
on Corporation, Sec. 701.) It is only after demand upon and re-
fusal by the corporation to bring the action or without demand
when the directors who committed the wrongful act continue to act
as such, that a stockholder in behalf of himself and others may sue.
(Hanna v. Lyon, 179 N. Y., 107.) Even then, the money recovered
belongs to the corporation, in whose right the action is brought. It
is to the corporation itself that directors are liable for the breach
of their duty. (Niles v. New York Central and Hudson River R. R.,
69 A. D., 144, 176 N. Y., 119.) For directors are the agents of
the entity and not of the stockholders or individuals. Thus, in
Niles v. New York Central, supra, a stockholder of a corporation
sued in his own behalf, alleging an injury done to the corporation
by the defendant. Upon demurrer, it was held that the injury done
was to the corporation itself and not to the stockholders; hence an
action for damages must be brought in behalf of the former. Upon
this authority two judges dissented from the principal case, hold-
ing that a right of action lay only in the defrauded subsidiary cor-
poration. Yet the distinction seems clear. The plaintiff here does
not sue in its own behalf as a stockholder in the wronged company
for injury done to the latter. It is suing as a corporation for injury
done to itself by reason of the unfaithfulness and neglect of its own
director. Hence it is submitted that the decision is sound.
JNSURANCE-CONDITIONS--BURDEN OF PROOF. Action brought
by plaintiff as surviving parent of one Feinman, a deceased member
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of defendant lodge, to recover the sum of $500 as a death benefit.
HIY.,, that in actions upon policies of insurance the allegation that
all of the conditions were fulfilled by the insured, even when denied
by the answer, does not place upon the plaintiff the burden of prov-
ing that each particular condition or agreement was fulfilled. (Fein-
man v. United States Grand Lodge, 149 N. Y. S., 862.)
A plaintiff suing on a contract must plead and prove perform-
ance of conditions precedent. (Newton Rubber Works v. Graham,
171 Mass., 352; Work v. Beach, 59 Hun., 625.) An express war-
ranty in a policy of insurance is a condition precedent, the burden
of proving performance of which rests upon the assured. (McLoon
v. Commercial Mutual Ins. Co., 100 Mass., 472.) Plaintiff must
allege in his pleadings the truth of all the statements in the applica-
tion and assume the burden of proof as to such of them as are de-
nied. (Fell v. Hancock Mitt. Life Ins. Co., 76 Conn., 494.) While
Rhode Island recognizes that conditions precedent must be proven
by the plaintiff, and holds that this rule applies to all contracts in-
cluding the contract of insurance, yet realizing the difficulty of
proving many details which in life insurance lie peculiarly within
the knowledge of the applicant himself, and that it would be unduly
burdensome, if not impossible, for another to prove them after the
applicant is dead, it has evolved the rule that the burden of proof
may be lifted, not shifted, by a presumption in favor of honesty
and against fraud, until something appears to rebut it. (Sweeny
v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 19"R. I., 171.) Although logically all condi-
tions precedent should be pleaded and proved, it is impracticable in
insurance law for plaintiff to prove all conditions precedent, war-
ranties and representations. The number of questions in the appli-
cations is usually very great, relating to habits and health of an-
cestors, the personal habits and condition of the applicant, etc., the
truth of many of which it would be impossible to prove after the
death of the insured. (Chambers v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 64 Minn., 495, 497.) Some courts in order to justify placing
the burden on the defendant have construed warranties and condi-
tions which are not "conditions precedent to the making of the con-
tract," as conditions subsequent. (Port Blakeley Mill Co. v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co., 50 Wash., 657.) The principal case is in accord
with the great weight of authority in favor of the practicableness
of placing the burden on the defendant, and with previous hold-
ings in New York. (Piedmont Life Ins. Co. v. Ewing, 92 U, S.,
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377; Globe Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n. v. Ahearn, 191 Ill., 167; Jones
v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 61 N. Y., 79; Rau v. Ins. Co., 50 N. Y.,
A. D., 428; Liesny v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 147 N4 Y., A. D., 253.)
PLEADING--FAILURE To PLEAD FOREIGN STATUTE. In an ac-
ton brought upon a promissory note, executed, deliver"ed and pay-
able in the State of Illinois, evidence of a statute of Illinois not al-
leged in the pleading was admitted over the objection of the plain-
tiff. HELD, thie statute of Illinois not having been pleaded it should
not have been received in evidence. (Peterson v. Fowler, 162 A. D.,
21.)
"It is a well settled rule, founded on reason and authority, that
the lex fori, or in other words the laws of the country to whose
court a party appeals for redress furnish in all cases, prima facie,
the rule of decision." (Monroe v. Douglas, 5 N. Y., 447.) "And
if either party desires the benefit of a different rule or law as,.for
instance, the lex domicili, lex loci contractus; or .lex loci rei sitae;
he must aver and prove it." (Monroe v. Douglas, supra, 447.)
.It is not sufficient merely to set forth the title of a foreign statute,
there must be allegations sliowing what the provisions of such stat-
ute are. (Howlan v. New York & N. I. Telephone Co., 131 A. D.,
443.) Foreign law may however be pleaded according to its legal
effect. (Berney v. Drexel, 33 Hun, 34.) If the defendant desire
a fuller statement of the facts as to the foreign law pleaded in the
complaint his remedy is not by demurrer but by a motion to make
more definite and certain. (Gleitsmann v. Gleitsmann, 60 A. D.,
371.) The point is well settled in New York. (Southwork v.
Morgan, 205 N. Y., 293), and the majority of the States concur
with New York. (Swank v. Hufnagle, 111 Ind., 453; The Great
Western Railway Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich., 305; Smith v. Mason,
44 Neb.,*610.)
PROPERTY-TRADE FIXTURES-WHEN REAL PROPERTY. More
than four months before Kesner Company went into bankruptcy,
claimants obtained a judgment against it, on which, however, exe-
cution was never issued. Since then, trade fixtures annexed by
Kesner Co. to the building it leased (which lease had some ten years
to run) were sold by the Trustee in bankruptcy. Claimants claim
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lien on proceeds of sale. HzLD, that, although as between Kesner
Co. and its landlord, the trade fixtures were removable as person-
alty, as between Kesner Co. and third persons they were real prop-
erty, being attached to a leasehold that had over five years to run at
the time of judgment, and were as real property subject to lien of
judgment although no execution was ever issued, under Code Sec.
1251. (Matter of J. L. Kesner Co., Bankrupt, U. S. Circuit Court
of Appeals, Second Circuit, December, 1914.)
The decision, it should be noted, holds these fixtures the real
property, not of the owner of the building to which they were an-
nexed, but of the Kesner Co., whose lease on the building had some
ten years to run. The prevailing opinion of Ward, Circuit Judge,
in which Coxe, J., concurs, reaches its conclusion by analogy from
the cases in New York holding that when an owner of land, who
has annexed fixtures to it, either sells or mortgages it, the fixtures
pass though not mentioned, (Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend., 636,
655; Day v. Perkins, 2 Sandf. Chan., 359), and cases holding that
the same rule applies in proceedings to take land under the right
of eminent domain (Schuchardt v. Mayor, 53 N. Y., 202, 208).
The objections that naturally present themselves to this line of rea-
soning, namely, that the one annexing the fixtures here was not the
owner of the land to which they were annexed, and that if they did
become real property they would be the property of the owner of
the building, are answered by the Court on the theory that as Kes-
ner's leasehold was, under Sec. 1430 of the Code, real property, he
annexed the fixtures to his own real property, i. e., the leasehold,
and that therefore the cases wherein an owner annexed fixtures to
his land were in point; and that in becoming real property the fix-
tures remained in Kesner's ownership and did not pass to the owner
of the building, as they were annexed to the leasehold which Kesner
owned and not to the fee which was in his landlord. When it is
considered that the result of all this is to give a decided preference
to certain of the bankrupt's creditors, the distinction seems a rather
fine one; but even granting the distinction a good one, there is still
another and very pertinent objection. The New York cases are
agreed that one of the important points to be considered in determ-
ining whether or not things personal in their nature, on annexation
to the realty, become part of it, is the intent of the parties at the
time of annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold.
(Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y., 344; Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 N. Y.,
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278; Matter of Hawkstone Street, 122 N. Y. Supp., 316.) That
intent may be found readily enough when the one annexing owns
the land in question; but in this case, can it be said that Kesner in-
tended the accession here to be permanent? The majority of the
Court admits that as between Kesner Co. and its landlord the fix-
tures were removable as personalty. It would seem that when Kes-
ner annexed the fixtures he intended that the annexation be tempor-
ary, that he would remove them before the expiration of his lease.
The dissenting opinion of Lacombe, C. J., holding that, because per-
sonalty in the beginning and nothing save temporary annexation as
trade fixtures appearing to show an intent to make them real prop-
erty, the fixtures remained personal property, seems better on prin-
ciple than the prevailing opinion.
